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1. Introduction 
According to an annual survey, Giving USA, total charitable giving in America in 
2004 amounted to $ 249 billion, over 2 percent of GDP. This outstanding figure 
reflects, in part, a response to what has been a consistent policy of US government 
since 1917 to grant favorable tax treatment to charitable contributions in order to 
promote philanthropy. Charitable contributions are accorded favorable tax treatment 
elsewhere too. This favorable treatment takes a variety of forms, including tax 
deductions or tax credits.  
  From a public economics point of view, a key reason for subsidizing 
charitable contributions derives from a Pigouvian motive. Looking at private charity 
as a voluntary mechanism for the provision of public goods implies that in the 
absence of intervention, individuals tend to overlook the positive externality their 
contributions exert on the rest of the community (the classical free-rider problem). 
This will be the case even when individuals derive utility from the act of giving itself, 
which provides them with an extra incentive to donate ['warm glow' approach as in 
Andreoni (1989, 1990)]. Recently, Diamond (2006) provides a novel argument in 
favor of the conventional wisdom about subsidizing charitable contributions. He 
points out that subsidizing private donations may mitigate the incentive constraints 
associated with income taxation, thereby allowing the government to attain further 
redistribution.  
  De-Botton (2005) points out that in a modern society, individuals' concerns 
about how they are being perceived by others have evolved to a level of anxiety. 
Following the work of Frank (1984a, 1984b, 1985a and 1985b) on the demand for 
status, there seems to be another motive for contributing; namely, the desire to 
demonstrate wealth. While there are other means to signal status, notably through   3
conspicuous consumption of private goods
1, Glazer and Konrad (1996) explain that 
there are good reasons to believe in a strong signaling motive for charity. They argue 
that conspicuous consumption, unlike charity, may be banned by social norms. They 
also point out that ownership of luxury goods may be difficult to observe reliably. In 
contrast, donations can prove very effective in conveying signals to individuals 
belonging to a peer group, who can not observe the big house or the luxury car (such 
as the case of distant college roommates who read the alma mater's alumni magazine 
and notice the recent contribution of their peers.).  
Glazer and Konrad (1996) cite empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis 
that donations are not purely driven by altruistic motives. One such evidence is that 
only a tiny fraction of donations is given anonymously. For instance, the fall 1991 
Yale Law Report, sent to the alumni of the Yale Law School, indicates that only 4 out 
of 1950 donors were anonymous. Furthermore, when donations are reported in broad 
categories, rather than the exact amounts given, people tend to 'converge' to the lower 
limit of the specified category. For instance, the 1993-4 report of the Harvard Law-
School Fund indicates that contributions of exactly $500 constitute 93 percent of total 
amount raised in the category $500-$999.  
Harbaugh (1998b) employs a theoretical model of the donor's optimization 
problem in Harbaugh (1998a), and uses data on reported donations of a prestigious 
law school alumni from the same cohort, to identify the status effect associated with 
donations ("prestige motive"). His estimation results indicate that many donors would 
more that double their donations in response to the prestige motive.
2  
                                            
1 Hirsch (1976) refers to those consumption goods used to signal status as 'positional goods'. 
2  Notably, a change in the category reporting plan of the university, which occurred during the period 
examined, resulted in a reduction in the number of donations at the omitted categories. This result is 
consistent with a prestige motive hypothesis.   4
The existence of a strong status-signaling motive for contributions alongside 
the altruistic one has two implications for the design of the tax treatment of charitable 
giving. First, on efficiency grounds, there is a case for taxing contributions as a means 
to internalize the negative externality associated with status acquisition  Second, on 
equity grounds, a signaling motive renders charitable contributions an extremely 
efficient 'tagging device' [as in Akerlof (1978)] of the high-ability individuals who 
seek to signal their social status.
3 This may call for taxing contributions as a 
supplement to the labor income tax system in order to attain enhanced re-distribution.  
Status effects have been examined by the labor income tax literature. Boskin 
and Sheshinski (1978) is an early study that incorporates status in the design of the 
optimal income tax. They employ a model in which individuals care not only about 
their absolute income level but rather also about their relative income level. However, 
they analyze only the externality effect of status, as individuals do not engage in 
signaling in their model. More recently, Ireland (1998 and 2001) employs a model in 
which individuals signal their social status through consumption choices. He focuses 
on the design of the income tax schedule and rules out the possibility of direct taxing 
of the consumption signals.
4 In the present study we develop a model that allows for 
public goods and status signaling through charitable contributions. This model 
provides a unified framework in which contributions are driven both by altruism and 
status signaling. We use this setup to re-examine the conventional practice of 
rendering a favorable tax treatment to charitable contributions. 
                                            
3  A recent survey of Philanthropy by The Economist (February, 2006) cites a study by Schervish of 
Boston College, showing that American Families with a net worth of 1 million dollars or more, 
accounted for 4.9 percent of the total number of donations to charitable organizations in 1997, but as 
much as 42 percent of the value. 
4  See Ireland (2001) for discussion of the difficulty of directly taxing consumption signals.   5
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic 
framework. In section 3 we characterize the equilibrium. The succeeding section 
examines the optimal tax treatment of charitable contributions. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The  Model 
Consider an economy with a continuum of individuals (whose number is 
normalized to one), producing a single consumption-good. Following Mirrlees (1971) 
we assume that individuals differ in their innate ability denoted by w (which also 
denotes the hourly wage rate in the competitive labor market). The production-
technology employs labor only and exhibits constant returns to scale and perfect 
substitutability among various skill levels. We further assume that the innate ability is 
distributed according to some cumulative distribution function ) (w F  with the support 
-  ] , [ w w .  
  As in Mirrlees (1971), all individuals share the same preferences, which are 
represented by the following utility function: 
(1) ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , , , ( g r z v l h c u b z p g z l c U ⋅ + ⋅ − + + + ⋅ ⋅ = α β β , 
where c denotes consumption, l denotes leisure, z denotes charitable contribution and 
g denotes public good provision; the functions u, h, v and r are assumed to be strictly 
concave and strictly increasing;  1 0   and   0   , 0 ≤ ≤ > > β α b . 
  The utility specification given in (1) captures the two contribution motives 
discussed in the introduction. The altruistic motive is captured by the function v which 
measures the joy of giving ('warm glow' effect). The strategic motive to signal ability 
and thereby gain social status was first investigated by Glazer and Konrad (1996). In 
our framework it is captured by the first term on the right-hand side of equation (1). 
To see this observe that for analytical tractability we assume a two (status) class   6
society (while a continuum of abilities); in such a society individuals gain social 
status if they credibly signal that their ability (the only source of heterogeneity in the 
economy) exceeds a certain threshold, denoted byw ˆ .
5 We emphasize that this 
threshold is exogenously given. Denoting by w ~  the perceived ability of an individual 
in equilibrium, we denote by p(z) the probability that the individual's perceived ability 
exceeds the threshold w ˆ , conditional on the fact that the individual has contributed z. 
Formally, 
(2)  ]. ˆ ~ Pr[ ) ( z w w z p ≥ =  
The parameter b captures the gain from social status. The product  b z p ⋅ ) (  thus 
measures the expected gains from status.
6 Note crucially that the status-signaling 
activity per se (that is, apart from its direct contribution to public good provision and 
to the joy of giving) is wasteful, because it does not add anything to total social 
welfare; for an elaborate discussion see section 4.2.   
The parameter β  measures the relative importance of each contribution 
motive. When 0 = β , contribution is purely altruistic, whereas when 1 = β , 
contribution is driven only by status seeking. 
  Several remarks are in order regarding the utility specification we have 
chosen. First, note that contributions finance a general pure public good. This is a 
simplifying assumption, as in reality many contributions finance local public 
(possibly congestible) goods; dropping out this assumption will not change the 
qualitative nature of the analysis. Note also that we make a 'large economy 
assumption' by letting the amount of public good provision, g, be a fixed parameter 
from the point of view of the individual (not depending on each individual's z). For 
                                            
5  Note that while there are only two status classes, there is nevertheless a continuum of abilities. Thus, 
our model is not restrictive for redistribution purposes. 
6  It is assumed that consumption and leisure choices of an individual are not observed (or cannot be 
verified) by other individuals. Thus, charitable contribution is the only signal observed.   7
most people this would reflect reality, whereas for the very rich individuals this might 
be violated. However, this assumption may reflect also the fact that contributors often 
gain very little from the projects financed by their own donations.
7 The parameter 
0 > α  represents the intensity of the preference for the public good (relative to other 
goods). 
  We assume that a linear labor income tax system is in place, where the 
marginal tax rate is denoted by t, and the uniform lump-sum transfer (possibly 
negative) is given by T. We further assume that a tax (s) on charitable contributions 
(possibly negative, that is a subsidy) may be levied. Note that allowing individuals to 
deduct their charitable contributions from their taxable incomes, or, granting them tax 
credits, amounts to such a subsidy. We turn next to characterize the equilibrium for 
the signaling game.  
 
3.   Equilibrium 
  For tractability, we follow Glazer and Konrad (1996) and Ireland (1994 and 
2001) in restricting attention to the separating fully revealing equilibrium, which in 
our framework implies that all individuals (and only those) with ability (weakly) 
exceeding the threshold w ˆ  signal their ability and enjoy the respective social status. 
This equilibrium is defined by a threshold level of contributions,  0 ˆ > z , and a 








z ˆ z       0
z ˆ z        1
) (z p  
                                            
7  Relaxing this assumption will not alter the gist of our analysis. An alternative assumption concerning 
the provision of public good is that each individual has a positive (that is, non-atomistic) mass; see, for 
instance, Green and Laffont (1979) and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986). The latter assumption 
may be particularly relevant in the context of local public goods.   8
(ii)  Given the probability function p(z), all individual whose innate ability is 
exceeding  w ˆ  choose to  contribute an amount  z z ˆ ≥ , whereas all other individuals 
optimally set their contribution at a level  z z ˆ < . We emphasize that z ˆ is endogenously 
determined (in equilibrium). Each individual who donates an amount exceeding z ˆ 
credibly signals that her innate ability is above the exogenously givenw ˆ , and hence 
derives a status gain.  
Each individual has to decide on the levels of consumption, leisure and 
charitable contribution, given the function p(z), so as to maximize the utility subject to 
the budget constraint: 
(3)  z s c T l w t ⋅ + + ≥ + − ⋅ ⋅ − ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( . 
We turn next to study the solution for the consumer optimization problem. Denote it 
by  ), (    and    ) ( ), (
* * * w z w l w c where the tax parameters are henceforth omitted to 
abbreviate the notation. Similarly, we denote by  ) (
* w V  the maximized level of utility.  
We can describe the individual decision as a two-stage process. First, she 
ignores the signaling motive and respective status benefit [that is, ignoring the term 
b z p ⋅ ⋅ ) ( β  in the utility function (1)], and chooses c, l and z so as to maximize the 
utility function (1) subject to the budget constraint (3). This is a standard utility 
maximization problem. We denote by  ) (   and   ) ( ), ( w z w l w c
NS NS NS , the optimal choices 
of consumption, leisure and charitable contribution, respectively, for an individual of 
ability w in this case, where the superscript NS stands for 'no-signaling'. Similarly, 
denote the corresponding value of the maximized utility by  ) (w V
NS . Now, in the 
second stage, we reinstate the signaling benefit term,  b z p ⋅ ⋅ ) ( β , and ask whether and 
how her choices in the first stage will be altered. There are two cases to consider.   9
Consider first an individual who chose in the first stage to contribute an 
amount (weakly) exceeding the threshold z ˆ, that is an individual with innate ability w 
for which  z w z
NS ˆ ) ( ≥ . For this individual, the term  b z p ⋅ ⋅ ) ( β  is a constant added to 
the utility function. Thus, there will be no change in behavior, that is: 
). ( ) (    and    ) ( ) ( ), ( ) (
* * * w z w z w l w l w c w c
NS NS NS = = =  
  Consider next an individual who chose in the first stage to make a contribution 
below the threshold z ˆ. Such an individual now has the option to increase her 
contribution to a level equaling or exceeding z ˆ and enjoy the status benefit of  b ⋅ β  
(recalling that p(z)=1 in this case). Imagine such an individual as maximizing her 
utility in (1), with the term  b ⋅ β , subject to the budget constraint (3), and an 
additional (signaling) constraint: 
(4)  z z ˆ ≥ . 
We denote by  ) (   and   ) ( ), ( w z w l w c
S S S , the optimal choices in this case of 
consumption, leisure and charitable contribution, respectively, for an individual of 
ability  w,  where the superscript S stands for 'signaling'. Similarly, we denote by 
) (w V
S  the corresponding maximized level of utility. An individual with innate ability 
w will choose to increase her contribution to z ˆ (but not beyond z ˆ - see below) if, and 
only if,  ). ( ) ( w V w V
NS S ≥  
  In equilibrium the following condition has to be satisfied: 
(5) ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( w V w V
S NS = . 
In words, the individual with the ability level w ˆ , the threshold ability above which 
individuals gain social status, has to be indifferent between signaling and not 
signaling. To see this, note that in a separating equilibrium, an individual with ability 
w ˆ  will choose to signal. Thus, the term on the left-hand side of (5) should not exceed   10
the term on the right-hand side. Suppose, by negation, that the inequality is strict, that 
is the individual strictly prefers to engage in signaling. By continuity considerations, 
an individual with ability slightly lower than w ˆ  will then also choose to signal, which 
would violate the definition of our equilibrium. Thus, we obtain a contradiction. 
Clearly, the equality in (5) implies that the signaling constraint in (4) has to bind, 
which in turn implies that  ) ˆ ( ˆ ) ˆ ( w z z w z
NS S > = . Mild parametric restrictions on the 
utility function in (1) guarantee the existence of a threshold level of contributions, z ˆ , 
which satisfies the equality in (5). For example, when the functions u, h and v are 
logarithmic, it is straightforward to verify that the equality in (5) is satisfied.
8 As 
0 ˆ / ) ˆ ( < ∂ ∂ z w V
S  whereas by construction,  0 ˆ / ) ˆ ( = ∂ ∂ z w V
NS , there exists a unique 
value of z ˆ for which the equality in (5) is satisfied (for any given set of tax 
parameters). To establish the existence of an equilibrium, we need to verify that for 
any ability w w ˆ < , individuals choose not to engage in signaling; whereas, for any 
ability level  w w ˆ > , individuals do engage in signaling. There are two cases to 
consider. Consider first the case where  z w z
NS ˆ ) ( ≥ . In such a case,  ) ( ) ( w V w V
NS S > , 
by construction. By virtue of the strict concavity of the functions u, h and v, charitable 
contribution, z, is a normal good; hence, as  ) ˆ ( ˆ w z z
NS > , this may only hold true for 
w w ˆ > , which is consistent with the separating equilibrium presumption. Consider 
next the case where z w z
NS ˆ ) ( < . In order to prove the result, it suffices to show that 
the following condition holds: 
(6) 0 / ) ( / ) ( ≥ ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ w w V w w V
NS S . 
                                            
8  To see this, note, that when
NS z z = ˆ ,  it follows that ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( w V w V
S NS < ; whereas, when 
) 1 /( ] ) 1 ( [ ˆ s T t w z + + − = ,  namely the individual spends her entire potential income on charitable 
contributions, consumption and leisure drop to zero, hence  −∞ = ) ˆ (w V
S , which obviously implies that 
) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( w V w V
S NS > . Existence follows by the intermediate value theorem.   11
To see why the equality in (6) holds, note that, by employing the envelope theorem, 
the inequality in (6) implies: 
(7) 0 )] ( 1 [ ) 1 ( ) ( )] ( 1 [ ) 1 ( ) ( ≥ − ⋅ − ⋅ − − ⋅ − ⋅ w l t w w l t w
NS NS S S λ λ , 
where 
NS S λ λ   and    are, correspondingly, the Lagrange  multipliers in the individual 
maximization for the 'signaling' and 'non-signaling' cases. By virtue of the strict 
concavity of the functions u, h and v, both consumption, c, and leisure, l, are normal 
goods. Thus, 
NS S NS S l l λ λ > <   and    (as 
NS S c c < ), which implies that the inequality in 
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(8d)  { } ) ( ), ( max ) (
* w V w V w V
S NS =  
Note also that z ˆ itself is determined in equilibrium, so as to make all individuals (and 
only these individuals) with innate ability above the threshold w ˆ  contribute an 
amount (weakly) exceeding z ˆ. Formally z ˆ is defined implicitly by equation (5). 
 
4.  The Tax-Treatment of Contributions 
The government is seeking to maximize some egalitarian social welfare function by 
choosing the fiscal instruments  g s T t    and    , , , subject to a revenue constraint, taking   12
into account the optimal choices of the individuals. The egalitarian social welfare 





w dF w V W W ) ( )] ( [,  
where  0 ) ( ' > V W  and  0 ) ( ' ' < V W . Naturally, the objective in (9) is maximized subject 
to the government revenue constraint, 
(10)  0 ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )] ( 1 [ ≥ − − ⋅ + + − ⋅ ∫ ∫






There is another constraint, which requires that the government cannot confiscate the 
charitable contributions and direct them to its general needs (redistribution purposes 
in our case). Put differently, the level of public good provision should weakly exceed 
the total amount of contributions: 
(11)  . 0 ) ( ) ( ≥ −∫
w
w
w dF w z g  
To gain insight of the effect of status-seeking on the optimal tax treatment of 
contributions, we will begin our analysis in the absence of this effect and introduce it 
only later. That is, we first consider the case where contributions are driven entirely 
by altruism, namely 0 = β . 
 
4.1.  The Case of Purely Altruistic Contributions 
We address the question of the desirability of levying a tax on (granting a subsidy to) 
charitable contributions, as a supplement to the optimal linear labor income tax 
system, when the contribution motive is purely altruistic. Starting from an optimal   13
linear income tax system with zero tax on contributions (s=0), we ask whether levying 
a small tax (possibly negative) on charitable contributions would increase welfare.
9  
Denote the Lagrangean expression for the optimal income tax problem, given 
a tax s on contributions, by: 
(12)
, ) ( ) (



































w dF w z g




where 2 1   and   µ µ  denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints in 
equations (10) and (11). Employing the envelope theorem and omitting the NS 
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* * *   and   , g T t denote the optimal tax parameters and  ) (w λ  denotes the Lagrange 
multiplier associated with the individual optimization. 
  There are two conflicting considerations in the design of the optimal 
tax/subsidy on charitable contributions. On the one hand, there is a Pigouvian motive 
to subsidize contributions, because they generate a positive externality. This is due to 
                                            
9   Assuming that second order conditions are satisfied, this would imply that the optimal tax on 
contributions should be positive (negative), if a small tax (subsidy, respectively) is shown to be 
desirable.    14
the fact that contributors fail to take into account the fact that any dollar contributed 
raises the well-being of other individuals as well (via increased provision of the public 
good). On the other hand, there is a re-distributive motive that calls for taxing 
contributions. To see this, note that in the presence of charitable contributions we 
have essentially two consumption goods: c and z. Furthermore, z is a normal good (as 
shown above). Thus, a tax on contributions accompanied by an upward adjustment in 
the lump-sum transfer (to maintain the government revenue constraint) is progressive 
and therefore enhances re-distribution. As shown by Deaton (1979), when the utility 
function is both separable (between leisure and the set of consumption goods) and 
homothetic (with respect to the set of consumption goods), commodity taxation is 
redundant in the presence of an optimal linear labor income tax. Thus, there are no re-
distributive gains from taxing contributions in this case, and we are left with the 
Pigouvian motive, suggesting that charitable contributions should be subsidized. This 
establishes the following proposition (the proof is relegated to Appendix A): 
Proposition 1: Suppose that the contribution motive is purely altruistic ( 0 = β ), if the 
function  ) ( ) ( ) , ( z v c u z c H + ≡  is homothetic, the optimal tax on charitable 
contributions is negative. 
  This proposition justifies tax deductibility of or tax credits to charitable 
contributions when the latter are motivated purely by altruism. Naturally, this result 
extends also to the case where the altruistic motive is sufficiently strong relative to the 
status seeking motive (namely, for β  sufficiently small). Note, however, that in the 
absence of separability and homotheticity, the redistributive motive that may call for 
taxing charitable contributions (especially when charitable giving is a sort of a luxury 
good) could dominate the Pigouvian  motive that calls for subsidizing such 
contributions, and a tax on charitable contributions may be called for.   15
  The case for subsidizing charitable contributions (allowing for tax deductions 
and/or credits) is further weakened when contributions are driven also by a status 
seeking motive. To demonstrate this argument in its sharpest relief, in the coming 
section we consider the extreme case where contributions are driven solely by the 
latter motive. 
  
4.2.  The Case of Pure Status-Signaling 
We address the question of the desirability of levying a tax on charitable 
contributions, as a supplement to the optimal linear labor-income tax system, when 
the contribution motive is driven by pure status seeking, namely 1 = β . Note crucially 
that the status-signaling activity per-se (that is, apart from its direct contribution to the 
amount of the public good) is purely wasteful. In the absence of signaling all 
individuals would obtain the same average status, whereas with signaling some do 
gain high status and some gain no status, leaving the average level of status exactly at 
the same level as without signaling. We emphasize that the aggregate (average) 
amount of status is exogenously given, at the level of  b w F ⋅ − )] ˆ ( 1 [ . Thus, status 
signaling can only affect the distribution of this aggregate level of status. When no 
one signals (that is, in a pooling equilibrium) the expected value of status derived by 
each individual is given by the average level of status. 
 We  re-formulate  the  Lagrangean for the case  1 = β , given a tax s on 
contributions, to obtain:   16
(14)
[] [] , ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( )] ˆ ( 1 [ ˆ         
)] ˆ ( 1 [ ˆ ) 1 ( ) ( )] ( 1 [ ) ( )] ( 1 [         
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where 3 , 2 , 1 , = i i µ  denote the Lagrange multipliers, associated, respectively, with the 
revenue constraint given in equation (10), the public good provision constraint in 
equation (11) and the signaling constraint in equation (5). Clearly, in the case of pure 
status-signaling, only individuals whose innate ability exceeds the threshold, w ˆ , 
engage in signaling via "charitable" contributions, and all of them will set their 
contributions at the level of z ˆ . All other individuals will set their contributions at 
zero. This implies that the total amount of contributions is given by the term 
)] ˆ ( 1 [ ˆ w F z − ⋅ , which appears both in the revenue constraint and the public good 
provision constraint in the Lagrangean expression in (14).
10 
  Starting from an optimal linear tax system with zero tax on contributions 
(s=0), we examine the effect of a small tax on contributions. We seek to sign the 
following derivative (see appendix B for details): 
(15)    
[]
, ˆ ) ˆ ( )] ˆ ( 1 [ z ˆ                            
) (
) (
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10  In this separating equilibrium all the individuals who signal, whose number is given by ) ˆ ( 1 w F − , 
obtain, each, a status level of b; all other individuals gain no status. The average level of status is given 
by  )] ˆ ( 1 [ w F − b.   17
Employing the first-order conditions for the optimal tax problem (see 
appendix C for details), we can re-write equation (15) as follows: 
(16)    
[]
[] .
Term   Pigouvian
)] ˆ ( 1 [ z ˆ   ) ( -
Term   Correction   Signaling
) ( ) ( )] ( [ ' ˆ                          
Term   tive Redistribu
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   Equation (16) decomposes the effect of a small tax on contributions into three 
terms. The first term on the right-hand side of equation (16) captures the redistributive 
effect of a unit increase in the tax on charitable contributions. To see this, note that the 
term )] ˆ ( 1 [ z ˆ w F − ⋅  is the additional amount of revenues raised by a unit increase in 
the tax on contributions (at s=0). Multiplying it by 1 µ , the marginal social benefit of a 
unit increase in the transfer (T), yields the effect of the extra revenues on social 
welfare. As the burden of this unit increase on each status-signaling individual (that 
is, each individual with innate ability exceedingw ˆ ) is z ˆ, then, indeed, the first term 
on the right-hand side of equation (16) captures the redistributive effect of a tax on 
contributions. This effect is positive and works in the direction of taxing "charitable" 
contributions, when the social welfare function exhibits a sufficiently large degree of 
inequality aversion.
11  
The second term, which also works in the direction of levying a tax on 
contributions, measures the corrective effect which offsets the wasteful status-
signaling costs. To see this, fully differentiate the signaling constraint in (5) with 
                                            
11  For instance, when the social planner is Rawlsian the second expression in the first set of brackets 
disappears and, clearly the re-distributive term is positive. Notably, in such a case, also the signaling 
correction term vanishes, as the contributors obtain zero weight in the social welfare measure.   18









Thus, a unit tax levied on contributions reduces the amount of contributions entailed 
by signaling byz ˆ, thereby raising the utility derived by the individuals who engage in 
signaling, and consequently social welfare, by the corresponding expression in 
equation (16).  
The last term captures the Pigouvian motive for subsidizing contributions. To 
see this, note first that the first-order condition for the optimal provision of the public 
good implies that: 
(17)  0 ) ( )] ( [ ' ) ( ' ) ( 2 1 > ⋅ ⋅ = − ∫
w
w
w dF w V W g r α µ µ .  
Because )] ˆ ( 1 [ z ˆ - w F − ⋅  is the effect of a unit tax on contributions on the total amount 
of public good, it follows that the third term measures indeed the gain in social 
welfare associated with the increase in public good provision generated by a unit 
subsidy granted to contributions. The third term is negative and works in the direction 
of granting a subsidy to contributions. 
  Note that the signaling correction term, which is the gain from a unit tax on 
contributions derived by the status-signaling individuals, is fully offset by the fact that 
each one of these individuals bears the tax on contributions. Hence, equation (16) 
reduces to:  
(18)  )]. ˆ ( 1 [ z ˆ   ) ( )] ˆ ( 1 [ z ˆ   2 1 1 * ˆ , * , * , * , 0 w F w F
s
L
z g T t s − ⋅ ⋅ − − − ⋅ ⋅ =
∂
∂
= µ µ µ  
The interpretation of equation (18) is straightforward. A unit tax on contributions 
raises government revenues [and the transfer (T)] by )] ˆ ( 1 [ z ˆ w F − ⋅ . But it also reduces 
total contributions for the public good by the same amount. Noting that  1 µ  is the   19
social marginal benefit of the transfer (T) and  0 2 1 > −µ µ  [see equation (17)] is the 
social marginal benefit of the public good (g) completes the interpretation of equation 
(18). Naturally, equation (18) reduces to: 






z g T t s µ  
As explained above, a unit tax on contributions shifts resources at the amount of 
)] ˆ ( 1 [ z ˆ w F − ⋅  from the public good provision (g) to the uniform transfer (T). The net 
marginal social benefit of this shift is indeed )] ˆ ( 1 [ z ˆ   2 w F − ⋅ ⋅ µ ,  because  2 µ  is the 
difference between the marginal social benefit of the uniform transfer ( 1 µ ) and the 
public good ( 2 1 µ µ − ). Note that the marginal social benefit of increasing g cannot 
exceed that of increasing T, because g is subject also to an additional constraint 
according to which it cannot fall short of the total amount of contributions. Thus, we 
establish: 
Proposition 2: When contributions are purely driven by status seeking ( 1 = β ), the 
optimal tax on contributions is non-negative. 
  Note that when the constraint in equation (11), which states that the 
government may not confiscate contributions and direct them towards its general 
budget [equation (10)], is binding, we may plausibly assume that the corresponding 
Lagrange multiplier ( 2 µ ) is strictly positive. In this case, it is optimal to levy a 
positive tax on contributions. Naturally, this will be the case when the demand for the 
public good is sufficiently small (that is, when α  is sufficiently small). 
  In contrast, when the demand for the public good is high enough (that is, when 
α  is large enough), the constraint in equation (11) will not be binding. Hence, 0 2 = µ , 
and it becomes optimal to set s=0. That is, it is not optimal for the government to   20
directly affect contributions by either taxing or subsidizing them (through deduction 
or credits). 
  The rationale for these results is straightforward. When constraint (11) is 
binding ( 0 2 > µ ), there is an excess provision of public good. In this case, the 
government employs the tax on contributions in order to shift resources from public 
good provision towards redistribution. In contrast, when constraint (11) is not binding 
( 0 2 = µ ), then the government is indifferent, at the margin, between allocating its 
revenues to the transfer (T) or the public good (g). Because a tax on contributions 
shifts resources from the public good to the transfer, there is no social gain or cost 
generated by such a tax. These results suggest that the reason for taxing status-driven 
contributions derives from the fact that the contributions themselves cannot be readily 
translated into redistribution, whereas the tax revenues can be.
12 
    
5. Conclusions 
  The conventional practice is to render a favorable tax treatment for charitable 
contributions, either through deductions or credits. The economic rationale for this 
practice is essentially Pigouvian: contributions for the financing of public goods 
generate a positive externality. In this paper, we point out that contributions may be 
also driven by a status-signaling motive. Therefore, as a pure signal, contributions 
generate also a negative externality. Moreover, contributions may be employed by the 
government in order to sort out the wealthy, and enhance redistribution. 
  Both considerations challenge the conventional practice. Naturally, whether 
and to what extent favorable tax treatment should be rendered to charitable 
contributions crucially depends on the relative strength of the altruistic motive vis-à-
                                            
12  We thank an anonymous referee for this observation.   21
vis the status-signaling one and on the desirability of the public goods financed by 
charity (the magnitude of the parameter α  in our model).  
The distinction between the conflicting tax implications of the two 
contributions motives raises the possibility of designing a system of differential tax 
treatment of contributions depending on whether they are anonymous or not. When 
contributions are anonymous, they indicate that they are driven by altruism. 
Therefore, a favorable tax treatment may be targeted toward the latter. Note further 
that the ability to signal status via 'charitable' contributions hinges crucially on the 
assumption that such contributions are indeed observable. The role of status-signaling 
in mitigating the free-rider problem may call for policy measures aimed at facilitating 
the dissemination of such information and rendering it more observable; see the 
related discussion of Cooter and Broughman (2005), suggesting a donation registry of 
the IRS via the internet.    22
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1 
We assume that second order conditions are satisfied, thus it suffices to show that 
there exists a marginal welfare gain by slightly decreasing the tax rate on charitable 
contributions from s=0. Differentiating the Lagrangean in (12) with respect to  T t,  
and g yields the following first-order conditions (suppressing the tax parameters to 
abbreviate notation):  
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By virtue of the homotheticity assumption, one can write the optimal choice of an 
individual of ability w as follows: 
(A4)  [ ] ) 1 /( )] ( 1 [ ) 1 ( ) ( s T w l w t w z + + − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ =δ , 
where  1 0 < <δ  and δ  is independent of w. 
Substituting for z(w) from (A3) into (13), following some algebraic manipulations 
employing (A1) and (A2), and re-arranging, yields the following simplified form of 
the derivative in (13):   23
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We need to prove that the sign of the derivative in (A5) is negative. We first turn to 
further simplify the expression on the right-hand side of (A5). Consider the following 
optimization problem, where an individual, given some labor/leisure choice, l, is 
choosing how to allocate the net income across consumption good, c, and charitable 
contribution, z. Formulating the Lagrangean yields: 
(A6)  [] ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 [( ) ( ) ( max ) , , , , ( z s c T l w t z v c u s t l w L ⋅ + − − + − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + + ≡ ν τ , 
where ν  denotes the Lagrange multiplier. Now consider a small change in the tax 
system around the optimal linear labor income tax system (set for s=0), which is 
defined as follows:  ) 1 ( , t dt ds − ⋅ ⋅ ∆ − = ∆ = δ and  T dT ⋅ ⋅ ∆ = δ , where  0 > ∆  and is 
arbitrarily small. Fully differentiating the Lagrangean in (A6), using the envelope 
theorem, then yields: 
(A7)  [] 0 ] ) 1 ( ) 1 [( , , 0 = + − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ ∆ = = T l w t z dL T t s δ ν , 
where the last equality holds for any l, by virtue of  the homotheticity [see (A4)] and 
the separability assumptions. It follows that the optimal labor/leisure choice of an 
individual of ability w (for all w) is unaffected by the suggested small perturbation in 
the tax system around the optimum. Thus, for all w, it follows that: 
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Substitution into (A5) yields: 
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Consider next, the following optimization problem, where an individual, given some 
choice of the level of charitable contributions, z, is choosing the level of the 
consumption good, c, and leisure, l. Formulating the Lagrangean yields: 
(A10)  [] ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 [( ) ( ) ( max ) , , , , ( z s c T l w t c u l h s t z w L ⋅ + − − + − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + + ≡ ν τ , 
where  ν  denotes the Lagrange  multiplier. Re-examining the effect of the small 
perturbation in the tax system around the optimum, by fully differentiating the 
Lagrangean in (A10), using the envelope theorem, yields: 
(A11)   [] ] ) 1 ( ) 1 [( , , 0 T l w t z dL T t s + − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ ∆ = = δ ν . 
Denote by ) (
* w z , the optimal choice of the level of charitable contributions of the 
individual with ability w, given the optimal tax system. By construction of the optimal 
choice of the individual given the optimal tax system prior to the perturbation, it 
follows that: 
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After the perturbation, it follows, by virtue of (A11), that for any  ) (
* w z z < , 
0 , , 0 > = T t s dL ; whereas, for any  ) (
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This implies that:   25
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Assuming that the second order conditions are satisfied, for any ability level, w, the 
individual is optimally reducing the level of charitable contributions in response to the 
suggested perturbation in the tax system. This implies that for every w,  
(A15)   0
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Substituting into the right-hand side of (A9), recalling that by virtue of (A3) it follows 
that the term 0 2 1 > −µ µ , yields: 






Thus, starting from a zero tax on charitable contributions, a small subsidy is socially 
desirable. This concludes the proof. 
  Note that when 0 → α , the term  0 ) ( 2 1 → −µ µ , by virtue of (A3), hence the 
optimal tax on charitable contributions converges to zero, due to the redundancy of 
commodity taxation.   26
Appendix B: Derivation of Equation 15 
Employing the envelope theorem, the effect of a small tax levied on contributions is 
given by the partial derivative of the Lagrangean in equation (14) evaluated at s=0 
given the optimal levels of the set of control variables: t, T, g andz ˆ .  Note that the 
(uniform) level of contribution in the pure status signaling case, z ˆ , is chosen as a 
control variable in the optimization, as we incorporate the signaling constraint in 
equation (5) into the Lagrangean  [the last expression on the right-hand side of 
equation (14)], so that its partial derivative with respect to s is zero.  
Differentiation yields thus the following expression: 
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In the pure status signaling case only individuals whose innate ability exceeds the 
threshold  w ˆ  choose to contribute (the amount of z ˆ ), whereas all other individuals set 















. By virtue of the individual optimization (employing the 









λ . Substitution into equation (B1) 
yields equation (15) in the main text.   27
Appendix C: Derivation of Equation 16 
We first re-formulate equation (15) in the main text for convenience. 
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Differentiation of the Lagrangean in (14) with respect to  ˆ z yields the following first-
order condition: 
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Substituting for the term  ) ˆ ( 3 w
S λ µ ⋅  from (C2) into (C1) yields: 
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Re-formulating the budget constraint faced by an individual who engages in signaling 
yields: 
(C4)  0 ˆ ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ˆ , , , , , ( = ⋅ + − − + − ⋅ ⋅ − ≡ z s c T l w t z s T t c l J . 
Differentiation of the expression in (C4) yields: 
(C5)  0
ˆ











Thus, for any ability level w, the following holds:   28
(C6)  0
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Substituting into (C3) yields equation (16) in the main text. This completes the 
derivation.   29
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